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Curran: Criminal Procedure

THE CURTILAGE OF OLIVER V. UNITED
STATES AND UNITED STATES V. DUNN:
HOW FAR IS TOO FAR?
Ah, yet e'er I descend to th' grave
May I a small house, and large garden have!
Abraham Cowley, THE MISTRESS, OR LOVE VERSES

INTRODUCTION
The 1984 United States Supreme Court decision in Oliver v.
United States 1 revived the open fields doctrine,2 and announced
a return to place-specific analysis of fourth amendment questions. Oliver sought to establish a per se "bright line" rule that
as a matter of law would exclude the "open field" around a residence from fourth amendment protection, and thus represents
an attempt by the Court to avoid the ad hoc, case-by-case analysis of privacy expectations such as that required under Katz v.
United States. s The Court's 1987 decision in United States v.
Dunn4 reiterated the rehabilitation of the open fields doctrine in
Oliver, and set out a four-part test for determining the extent of
the open fields in the context of fourth amendment search and
seizure issues involving residences.
Oliver and Dunn present substantial difficulties to police
and courts attempting to implement the rules of the cases in the
field and courtrooms. An examination of the two cases reveals
that no genuinely autonomous doctrine has been revived: applying the open fields "doctrine" of Oliver and Dunn involves virtually the same inquiries as the "reasonable expectation of privacy" test of Katz. Rather than providing a bright line rule that
will efficiently dispose of fourth amendment problems, it is read1. 466 U.S. 170 (1984).

2. The history of the open fields doctrine is sketched infra at notes 5-54 and accompanying text.
3. 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
4. 107 S.Ct. 1134 (1987).
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ily foreseeable that in addition to challenges under Katz, defendants will also routinely challenge residential searches under
Oliver and Dunn. Because analysis under Katz and the open
fields doctrine are virtually indistinguishable, courts will be
compelled to waste time rehashing identical issues. In addition
to their negative implications for judicial economy, Oliver and
Dunn represent a retreat from the Court's historic tendency to
apply the fourth amendment flexibly and expansively to meet
new demands placed on it by an evolving society.
This comment will first gloss the history of the open fields
doctrine in fourth amendment jurisprudence; proceed to a review of the factual and procedural contours of Oliver and Dunn;
analyze and comment upon the decisions; and conclude with recommendations for dealing with the difficulties presented by the
cases.
THE OPEN FIELDS AND THE CURTILAGE
The open fields doctrine had its birth as a constitutional canon in United States v. Hester./5 Convicted of concealing moonshine whiskey in violation of Prohibition statutes, appellant
Hester claimed that his conviction was constitutionally flawed
under the fourth amendment because officers trespassed onto
private property to effect the search and seizure that culminated
in his arrest. 8 In his brief opinion in Hester Justice Holmes proclaimed, however, that "the special protection accorded by the
Fourth Amendment to the people in their 'persons, houses, papers, and effects,' is not extended to the open fields."7 Since
Hester had put the contraband liquor within officers' reach in an
open field,8 no fourth amendment violation had accrued when
the officers seized the contraband. As his rationale for the
Court's new rule, Justice Holmes offered that "[t]he distinction
5. 265 U.S. 57 (1927).
6. [d. Observed by revenue officers, Hester had just concluded a sale of moonshine

whiskey to a customer on land apparently in the vicinity of his father's house, when
"[aln alarm was given." [d. at 58. Hester seized a jug from his car and fled, as did his
customer. One of the officers pursued, and fired a shot. Hester dropped the jug, which
broke but retained some of its contents. These were identified as contraband liquor, and
led to Hester's conviction. His appeal was based on "the hypothesis that the examination
of the vessels took place upon Hester's father's land." [d. at 59.
7. [d. at 59.
8. [d.
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between [the open field] and the house is as old as the common
law."9 The common law doctrine to which Holmes adverted was
the curtilage, for which he had to turn as far back as Blackstone
for authority.lo The problem that Hester hatched lies in the fact
that the open field, which does not receive fourth amendment
protection, lies outside the curtilage, an area surrounding the
residence which does receive protection." Hester, however,
failed to define either the "open field" or the "curtilage," and
thereby presented substantial difficulties to courts and police attempting to apply the new rule. 12
Olmstead v. United States l3 attempted to resolve some of
the practical difficulties presented by Hester. Olmstead was the
head of a ring engaged in the illicit distribution of liquor, and
was convicted of violation of the National Prohibition Act l4 as
the result of information from taps on his phone lines. He alleged the taps violated his fourth amendment rights. Iii Taking a
literal approach to the language of the amendment, the Court
declared that only a "physical invasion of [an individual's]
house 'or curtilage'" (emphasis added)16 came within the scope
of the amendment; since the Court found that the phone taps
did not involve any physical intrusion into Olmstead's house,
they thus did not violate the amendment. In making the degree
of actual physical intrusion the dispositive test in residential
9. [d.

10. 4 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *223, 225, 226. The curtilage doctrine had its
roots in crilJlinal law, defining the area outside of, but near enough to, a structure
wherein a burglary may be committed. Whether a doctrine grounded in property concerns (protecting it from burglary) is properly to be extended to fourth amendment privacy analysis is a troubling proposition. See infra notes 18-20 and accompanying text.
It is ironic that Justice Holmes should have sought his authority for the open fields
doctrine in the antiquated concept of the curtilage. It was Holmes, after all, who complained that "[i)t is revolting to have no better reason for a rule of law than that it was
laid down in the time of Henry IV. It is still more revolting if the grounds upon which it
was laid down have vanished long since, and the rule simply persists from blind imitation of the past." Holmes, The Path of the Law, 10 HARV. L. REV. 457, 469 (1897).
Holmes, hoist by his own petard?
11. See supra note 10.
12. See infra notes 13-26 and accompanying text.
13. 277 U.S. 438 (1928).
14. [d. at 455-56.
15. [d. at 456-57.
16. "The Fourth Amendment... [is not) violated ... unless there has been an official search and seizure of [an individual's) person, or such a seizure of his papers or his
tangible material effects, or an actual physical invasion of his house 'or curtilage' for the
purpose of making a seizure." [d. at 466.
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searches and seizures challenged under thf\ fourth amendment,
Olmstead originated the "constitutionally protected area"17
analysis that was to be critical to fourth amendment jurisprudence until Katz v. United States dispensed with it.
The announcement of the open fields doctrine (and its necessary homolog, the curtilage) in Hester and Olmstead has been
the subject of criticism. Remarking on the incongruity of the notion that a common law rule dealing with the protection of property18 should bear upon a constitutional amendment that protects the privacy interests of individuals,19 one commentator
declared that: "[I]t is bizarre that the curious concept of curtilage, originally taken to refer to the land and buildings within
[a] baron's stone walls, should ever have been deemed to be of
controlling significance as to the constitutional limits upon the
powers of the police. "20
In addition to their precarious doctrinal underpinnings,
Hester and Olmstead presented significant practical difficulties
to police and courts attempting to apply the rules of the cases.
"Constitutionally protected area" analysis required complicated
ad hoc, fact-specific determinations to find just where the protected curtilage left off and the unprotected open fields began.
Not surprisingly, disparate results were reached in similar factual situations. Fourth amendment protection was variously
granted and denied to garages,21 barns 22 and hen houses. 23 Pro17. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 350 (1967).
18. "In the section of Blackstone's Commentaries to which the Court cited, Blackstone described the elements of common law burglary." United States v. Dunn, 107 S.Ct.
1134, 1139 n.3 (1987). See also supra note 10 and accompanying text.
19. See Camara v. San Francisco, 387 U.S. 523, 528 (1967): "The basic purpose of
this [Fourth) Amendment, as recognized in countless decisions of this Court, is to safeguard the privacy and security of individuals against arbitrary invasions by governmental officials. (Emphasis added)."
20. 1 W. LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE 314 (1978). See also supra, note 10 and accompanying text.
21. Taylor v. United States, 286 U.S. 1 (1932) (garage protected by fourth amendment); Martin v. United States, 183 F.2d 436 (4th Cir. 1950) (garage protected by fourth
amendment but warrantless search permissible where officer made prior "painstaking
investigation"); State v. Brochu, 237 A.2d 418 (Me. 1967) (detached garage within scope
of warrant); State v. Manning, 134 N.W.2d 91 (1965) (non consensual entry of garage is
impermissible search). But see Carney v. United States, 163 F.2d 784 (9th Cir. 1947)
(fourth amendment did not apply to detached garage); People v. Lees, 257 Cal. App. 2d
363, 64 Cal. Rptr. 888 (1967) (permitting warrantless search of rented garage).
22. Rosencranz v. United States, 356 F.2d 310 (1st Cir. 1966) (small barn near house
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tection was extended to a smokehouse24 and a bathhouse,21i but
disallowed to other outbuildings. 26
In 1967, the Supreme Court in Katz v. United States 27 held
that the proper test for granting or denying fourth amendment
protection was not an analysis of the locus of a challenged
search or seizure, but an inquiry into whether the individual invoking the amendment's protection entertained a reasonable expectation of privacy in the place searched. 28 In Katz, an electronic eavesdropping device attached to the outside of a public
telephone booth detected information in his conversations that
led to petitioner Katz' arrest for interstate transmission of wagering information over telephone lines.29 Both Katz and the
government applied Olmstead analysis: Katz urged that the
phone booth was a "constitutionally protected area" for purposes of fourth amendment protection, and the government argued that it was not. 80 The Court rejected the Olmstead approach. Reasoning that "the Fourth Amendment protects
people, not places[,]"81 Justice Stewart for the majority announced that the proper inquiry is whether a search or seizure
"violate[s] the privacy upon which [Katz] justifiably relied."82
Under this analysis, the Court held that "what [Katz sought] to
preserve as private, even in an area accessible to the public, may
be constitutionally protected. "88 The Court concluded that Katz
had a justifiable expectation of privacy in his conversations in
the telephone booth, and the conversations were therefore protected under the fourth amendment. In removing "places" from
within curtilage of house); Walker v. United States, 225 F.2d 447 (5th Cir. 1955) (fenced
barn 70-80 yards from house within curtilage of house).
23. People v. Lind, 370 Ill. 131, 18 N.E. 189 (1938) (warrantless search of chickenhouse impermissible). But see Hodges v. United States, 243 F.2d 281 (5th Cir. 1957)
(fenced chickenhouse 150 feet from house not within curtilage of house).
24. Roberson v. United States, 165 F.2d 752 (6th Cir. 1948) (smokehouse within curtilage of house).
25. Wakkuri v. United States, 67 F.2d 844 (6th Cir. 1933) (bathhouse adjacent to
house within curtilage of house).
26. Brock v. United States, 256 F.2d 55 (5th Cir. 1958) (concrete block outbuilding
150-180 feet from nearest residence not within curtilage of residence).
27. 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
28. Id. at 360 (Harlan, J., concurring).
29. Id. at 348.
30. Id. at 351.
31. Id.
32. Id. at 353.
33. Id. at 351.
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fourth amendment decisional calculus, the Court cut away the
tangled and contradictory34 thicket of rules and precedent that
had accumulated under the rubric of the "constitutionally protected area. "311
The vitality of the open fields doctrine after Katz was uncertain. Although it had explicitly overruled Olmstead,36 Katz
did not overrule Hester.37 Subsequently, when faced with curtilage problems, lower courts divided between reliance on the
Katz "reasonable expectation of privacy" test and continued resort to the venerable Hester doctrine. The view of most courts
appears to have been that Katz rendered the open fields doctrine obsolete, perhaps through redundancy:38 if the ultimate
criterion of fourth amendment analysis is the existence of a reasonable expectation of privacy, finding that a search or seizure
had been carried out in the "open field" could be considered
equivalent to the conclusion that the area was so far removed
from a residence (in either distance or purpose) that no legitimate expectation of privacy could attach. A number of courts
held, however, that the open fields doctrine continued to be applicable in relevant cases,39 and some commentary found the lat34. See supra notes 21-26, and accompanying text.
35. "[Tlhis Court has occasionally described its conclusions in terms of 'constitutionally protected areas,' ... but we have never suggested that this concept can serve as a
talismanic solution to every Fourth Amendment problem." Katz v. United States, 389
U.S. 347, at 351, n.9. "We conclude that the underpinnings of Olmstead . .. have been [)
eroded by our subsequent decisions ... [and] can no longer be regarded as controlling."
[d. at 353.
36. [Allthough a closely divided Court supposed in Olmstead that surveillance without any trespass and without the seizure of any
material object fell outside the ambit of the Constitution, we
have since departed from the narrow view on which that decision rested . . . . We conclude that the underpinnings of Olmstead. . .have been so eroded by our subsequent decisions
that the 'trespass' doctrine there enunciated can no longer be
regarded as controlling.
[d. at 353.
37. [d. at 360-61 (Harlan, J., concurring).
38. See, e. g.: United States v. Swart, 679 F.2d 698, 702 (7th Cir. 1982) (Katz supplants the open fields doctrine); United States v. Freie, 545 F.2d 1217, 1223 (9th Cir.
1976), cert. denied, 430 U.S. 966 (1977) (open field merely an aspect of determination of
reasonableness of privacy expectation); People v. McClaugherty, 193 Colo. 360, 566 P.2d
361 (1977) (open fields doctrine made obsolete by Katz); State v. Stanton, 7 Or. App.
286, 490 P.2d 1274 (1971) (open fields doctrine made obsolete by Katz). See also Note:
Florida v. Brady: Can Katz survive in open fields?, 32 AM. U.L. REV. 921, 930 (1983).
39. Air Pollution Variance Bd. v. Western Alfalfa Corp., 416 U.S. 861 (1974) (search
valid despite official's trespass on private property); United States v. Cain, 454 F.2d 1285
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ter cases-and the open fields and curtilage doctrines themselves-not necessarily inconsistent with Katz."o
Applying the Katz test presented other problems. Katz
properly focussed fourth amendment litigation on the protection
of societally reasonable privacy interests, an ultimate purpose"1
of the amendment. Weighing matters in the scales of the amendment's ultimate purposes is likelier to reach right results than a
hair-splitting sojourn into the formalistic jurisprudence of "constitutionally protected areas." But the determination of just
what is or is not a reasonable expectation of privacy under Katz
requires a detailed inquiry into, and an ad hoc weighing of, the
facts of any case raising a fourth amendment challenge to a
search or seizure. The contours of the analysis require: first, a
determination of whether or not an actual subjective privacy expectation existed in the case at bar; and second, whether that
expectation was one that society was prepared to accept as reasonable. 42 In particular, the determination of societally acceptable reasonableness, involving as it does a divination of broad
societal expectations, invites police and courts to attempt delicate judgments based on vague and shifting criteria. "3
In its 1984 decision in Oliver v. United States,"" the United
States Supreme Court rejected case-by-case analysis of warrantless searches of rural or semi-rural residences. n The Court in(7th Cir. 1972) (warrantless search of property open to hunters was permissible).
40. This [continued reliance on the curtilage doctrine) is not particularly objectionable, for there is no reason to view Katz as having somehow reduced the protection of in-curtilage structures;
surely a justified expectation of privacy exists as to them. But
it will no longer do to declare routinely that any entry of a
structure beyond the curtilage is not a Fourth Amendment
search.
W. LAFAVE, supra, note 20, at 315.
41. Katz addresses principally the privacy aspect of the amendment. The amendment's other purpose is the prevention of state abuses of its police power. See supra note
19.
42. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 361 (Harlan, J., concurring).
43. "Few issues are more vexed than the meaning in particular situations of a 'reasonable expectation of privacy.''' Tarantino v. Baker, 825 F.2d 772, 775 (4th Cir. 1987).
44. 466 U.S. 170 (1984).
45. "Nor would a case-by-case approach provide a workable accommodation between the needs of law enforcement and the interests protected by the Fourth Amendment." [d. at 181.
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stead sought to substitute a "bright line"'s rule that "an individual has no legitimate expectation that open fields will remain
free from warrantless intrusion by government officers[;]"47 open
fields would therefore be per se excluded from fourth amendment protection. The Court explicitly reaffirmed Hester,'8 asserting that the open fields doctrine is consistent with Katz
analysis of fourth amendment issues. 49
Unfortunately, Oliver, like Hester before it, did not furnish
any clear insight into the practical difficulties of determining the
border between the curtilage and the open fields. The "constitutionally protected area" analysis of Olmstead, formerly applied
to open fields questions, had been overruled in Katz and was no
longer available. llo Nevertheless, Justice Powell, writing for the
majority, apparently did not believe that the absence of a clear
standard for applying Oliver would be a substantial problem. He
maintained that: "[F]or most homes, the boundaries of the curtilage will be clearly marked; ...the conception defining the curtilage. . .is a familiar one easily understood from our daily experience."lIl Nevertheless, mindful of the lack of a clear test for the
application of the Oliver rule,1I2 three years later the Court in
United States v. Dunn ll3 announced four factors ll4 to be considered in resolving questions of the extent of an alleged curtilage.

46. Note, Affirmation of the Open Fields Doctrine: The Oliver Twist, 46 OHIO ST.
L.J. 729 (1985); Comment, Oliver v. United States: Powell Chases Katz Out of the
Fields, 62:3 & 4 DEN U.L. REV. 899 (1985).
47. Oliver v. United States, 466 U.S. 170, 181 (1984).
48. "In this light, the rule of Hester v. United States . .. that we reaffirm today .... " [d. at 178.
49. [d. at 177.
50. Because the Court in Katz had expressly overruled Olmstead, but not Hester,
the Oliver majority therefore presumably declined to rehabilitate Olmstead as it had
Hester. See supra note 35.
51. Oliver v. United States, 466 U.S. 170, 182, n.12 (1984).
52. "Drawing upon the Court's own cases and the cumulative experience of the
lower courts that have grappled with the task of defining the extent of a home's curtilage .... " United States v. Dunn, 107 S.Ct. 1134, 1139 (1987).
53. 107 S.Ct. 1134 (1987).
54. [d. at 1139.
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OLIVER V. UNITED STATES AND UNITED STATES V.
DUNN:
THE
FACTUAL
AND
PROCEDURAL
BACKGROUND
I. OLIVER V. UNITED STATES

Oliver was a consolidation of two cases. In the first, petitioner Oliver was convicted under 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1) of manufacturing a controlled substance. eili In response to an anonymous
tip that he was growing marijuana on his Kentucky farm, police
officers went to Oliver's property to investigate. Ci6 The officers
drove up Oliver's private road past several "no trespassing"
signs and petitioner's house to a locked gate posted with a "no
trespassing" sign. Ci7 They walked around the gate and for several
hundred yards beyond, until they reached the vicinity of a barn
and parked camper; there they were hailed by an unseen individual, who shouted, "No hunting is allowed, come back up
here. "Ci8 The officers, however, continued their search until they
came upon a field of marijuana more than a mile from Oliver's
house. Ci9 The field was "highly secluded...and bounded on all
sides by woods, fences and embankments and [could not] be
seen from any point of public access."60 Applying Katz analysis,
the district court suppressed evidence of the marijuana field; the
court held that Oliver had a reasonable expectation of privacy in
the field because he had done all that could be expected to assert his privacy interest in the field by choosing its secluded location and inhibiting public access to it. 61 The Court of Appeals
for the Sixth Circuit reversed. 62
The Supreme Court concurred with the S.ixth Circuit and
held that neither Oliver's precaution of locking' and posting the
gate, nor the seclusion of the cultivated field, were sufficient to
bring the marijuana patch within the protection of the fourth
amendment. 63 Conceding that these precautions may have evi55. Oliver v. United States, 466 U.S. 170, 173 (1984).
56.Id.
57. Oliver v. United States, 686 F.2d 356, 362 (6th Cir. 1982) (Keith, J., dissenting).
58. Oliver v. United States, 466 U.S. 170, 173 (1984).
59.Id.
60. Id. at 174.
61. Id. at 173-74.
62. Id. at 174.
63. Id. at 182.
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denced petitioner's subjective privacy expectations, the Court
ruled that it was nevertheless also necessary that Oliver's subjective privacy expectation be one that society would recognize as
"reasonable."6' Reaffirming Hester,6f> the Court found that any
privacy expectation in an open field is per se unreasonable. 66
Since the Court went on to agree with the Sixth Circuit that the
marijuana patch was an open field, the patch was therefore necessarily to be denied fourth amendment protection, and Oliver's
conviction was therefore affirmed. 67
The pertinent facts in the companion case were similar. Responding to an anonymous tip, two police officers followed a
path into woods behind respondent Thornton's house in rural
Maine, where they discovered two marijuana patches. 6s After determining that the patches were on Thornton's property, the officers secured a warrant to seize the marijuana. 69 Thornton was
arrested and indicted for marijuana cultivation on the basis of
this seizure. 7o In response to his motion to suppress, the trial
court found that Thornton had evinced a reasonable expectation
of privacy in his property and that the open fields doctrine thus
did not apply; the motion to suppress was granted. 71 The Maine
Supreme Judicial Court affirmed. 72
The Supreme Court, as in the case of petitioner Oliver,
found that Thornton's marijuana patches were in an open field.
Again applying the new rule that as a matter of law no reasonable expectation of privacy attaches to an open field,n the majority held that respondent Thornton was not protected by the
fourth amendment from the warrantless search of his property.
Thornton's case was therefore reversed and remanded.'"
64. "[T]he correct inquiry is whether the government's intrusion infringes upon the
personal and societal values protected by the Fourth Amendment." (Emphasis added.)
[d at 182-83.
65. [d. at 178.
66. "[N]o expectation of privacy legitimately attaches to open fields." [d. at 180.
67. [d. at 174.
68. [d.
69. [d.
70. [d.
71. [d. at 175.
72. [d.
73. [d. at 181.
74. [d. at 184.
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UNITED STATES V. DUNN

In United States v. Dunn,7r> respondent Dunn appealed
convictions for various offenses involving controlled substances
(phenylacetone and amphetamine) under 21 U.S.C. § 846. 76
Dunn's co-defendant had been detected purchasing drug-manufacturing equipment and supplies; authorities secured a warrant
to plant electronic tracking devices in the paraphernalia,
through which it was subsequently traced to Dunn's ranch. 77
Federal and local law enforcement officers made a warrantless
entry onto Dunn's property to investigate. 78 Crossing the perimeter fence and at least one of several interior fences, the officers
traversed the large ranch until they reached a clearing where
Dunn's house and several outbuildings were located; these structures were surrounded by woods a half mile from the public road
and were not visible from outside the ranch's perimeter fence. 79
Detecting the odor of suspicious chemicals, the officers climbed
over the locked gate in the exterior fence of a barn located some
distance from the house and peered into the barn's interior,
where they saw what they believed to be a drug laboratory.8o
This barn was of "substantial" construction, and its interior
could be viewed only with difficulty.81 The next day, the officers
made two more warrantless entries onto the ranch to confirm
their discovery.82 Based on their observations, the officers obtained a warrant which they executed two days later, seizing
drugs and drug manufacturing equipment and supplies. 83
United States v. Dunn took a convoluted path to the Supreme Court. The district court refused Dunn's motion to suppress the evidence seized at his ranch, and he and his co-defendant were convicted. 8 " The Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit
75. 107 S.Ct. 1134 (1987).
76. Id. at 1137.
77. Id.
78. United States v. Dunn, 766 F.2d 880, 883 (5th Cir. 1985).
79. Id. at 882. .
80. United States v. Dunn, 107 S.Ct. 1134, 1137-38 (1987).
81. Id. at 1145 (Brennan, J., dissenting, citing United States v. Dunn, 674 F.2d 1093,
1100 (5th Cir. 1982)).
82. Id. at 1138.
83.Id.
84.Id.
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reversed; applying open fields analysis,811 the court found that
the evidence had been seized as a result of unlawful warrantless
searches within the curtilage of respondent's residence. 86 On its
first encounter with Dunn, the Supreme Court vacated and remanded for reconsideration in light of Oliver,87 which it had recently handed down. 88 On remand, the Fifth Circuit at first affirmed; although it concluded that the barn was not within the
curtilage of Dunn's house, the Fifth Circuit ruled that Dunn
nevertheless had a reasonable privacy expectation in the barn. 89
Before this decision could be reviewed by the Supreme Court,
however, the Fifth Circuit recalled it and reinstated its original
opinion that the barn was within the protected curtilage of respondent's house. 90

Dunn then returned to the Supreme Court. Based on the
revival of the open fields doctrine in Oliver,91 the Court first
held that Dunn would be decided under the doctrine,92 and then
evolved a four-part test for use in fourth amendment controversies to determine the extent of any curtilage which might exist:
"[1] the proximity of the area claimed to be curtilage to the
home, [2] whether the area is included within an enclosure surrounding the home, [3] the nature of the uses to which the area
is put, and [4] the steps taken by the resident to protect the
area from observation by people passing by."93 Applying this
test, the Court found that, despite the seclusion of the structures
and the fences and woods surrounding it, the clearing on which
Dunn's house and barn were located was an open field, and
under Oliver is per se excluded from fourth amendment protection. 9• The officers' discovery of the laboratory inside the barn
thus did not violate the fourth amendment, because their observations of the barn interior had been made from an open field
where the officers could be present without violating the amend85. United States v. Dunn, 674 F.2d 1093, 1100 (5th Cir. 1982).
86.Id.
87. Oliver V. United States, 466 U.S. 170 (1984).
88. United States V. Dunn, 107 S.Ct. 1134, 1138 (1987).
89.Id.
90.Id.
91. [d.
92. [d. at 1139.
93. [d.

94. See supra notes 65-66, and accompanying text.
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ment. 911 The judgment of the Fifth Circuit was therefore
reversed. 96

OLIVER V. UNITED STATES AND UNITED STATES V.
DUNN: ANALYSIS AND COMMENT
I.

OLIVER V. UNITED STATES

Oliver v. United States explicitly revived the open fields
doctrine enunciated in Hester v. United States,97 and made
clear the Supreme Court's conviction that the doctrine is consistent with Katz fourth amendment analysis. 98 The revival of the
open fields doctrine also necessarily led to the renewed vitality
of the curtilage in fourth amendment analysis. 99 The Oliver majority relied on three analyses to support its holding: first, a literal reading of the fourth amendment;lOO second, a finding that
open fields do not harbor those "intimate" domestic activities
which the fourth amendment is designed to protect from governmental interference;lol and third, the advantages of a simple per
se rule over ad hoc, fact-specific analysis for determination of
fourth amendment issues. 102
These three aspects of Oliver will be examined and commented upon separately below. A summary will then suggest an
approach preferable to the open fields doctrine of Oliver.
1.

The Court's Literal Approach to the Fourth Amendment

As the first step in reestablishing the open fields doctrine,
the 'Oliver majority looked first to the literal meaning of the
95. United States v. Dunn, 107 S.Ct. 1134, 1141 (1987).
96. [d. Dunn had also made an alternative argument that he enjoyed a legitimate
expectation of privacy in the barn independent of Oliver open fields theory. The major-

ity found that since there was only observation of, and not entry into, the barn's interior,
any privacy expectation Dunn may have entertained was not violated. [d. at 1140-41.
97. 265 U.S. 57 (1924).
98. Oliver v. United States, 466 U.S. 170, 184 (1984): "We conclude that the open
fields doctrine .. .in Hester accords with the 'reasonable expectation of privacy' [i.e.,
Katz) analysis developed in subsequent decisions of this Court."
99. "[O)nly the curtilage, not the neighboring open fields, warrants the Fourth
Amendment protections that attach to the home." [d. at 180.
100. [d. at 176-77.
101. [d. at 179.
102. [d. at 181.
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fourth amendment. Strictly construing the language of the
amendment, the Court reasoned that since open fields are not
"persons, houses, papers, [or] effects," they are not to be accorded the amendment's protection. lOS (In his concurrence, Justice White favored deciding Oliver entirely on this literal approach to the amendment, declaring: "However reasonable a
landowner's expectations of privacy may be, those expectations
cannot convert a field into a 'house' or an 'effect.' "104) The
Court's intention in adopting this "literal" approach was apparently to simplify inquiries into extra-residential searches under
the fourth amendment, by simply defining away a large area in
which the amendment could be implicated. Any simplification of
the problem was precluded, however, when the Court conceded
that although it is not specifically mentioned in the amendment,
the curtilage, too, is subject to fourth amendment protection.
The term "houses," for purposes of interpreting the fourth
amendment, also includes that area around a house wherein occurs the "intimate activity"lOIi associated with domestic life.
Under the "literal" approach of Oliver, therefore, analysis will
return to the complex task of locating the border between the
open fields and the curtilage which historically bedeviled the
open fields doctrine. loa
Aside from its failure to simplify analysis of extra-residential searches, there is another objectionable feature to the "literal" reading of the fourth amendment adopted by the Court.
While it suggests a continuing restrictive view of the scope of the
fourth amendment, and comports with a number of recent decisions by the Court taking a stringent view of protection available
under the amendment,107 the literal approach runs counter to a
long-established trend of the Court preferring flexible reading of
the amendment. In a world in which technological advances
steadily enhance the ability of the government to erode individ103. Id. at 176·77.
104. [d. at 184 (White, J., concurring).
105. [d. at 180.
106. See supra notes 11·26 and accompanying text.
107. See, e.g., New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325 (1985) (search of student property
by school authorities requires neither warrant nor probable cause); United States v.
Leon, 468 U.S. 897 (1984) (evidence seized by police in good faith reliance on defective
warrant is not subject to the exclusionary rule); Nix v. Williams, 467 U.S. 431 (1984)
(evidence seized without warrant is not subject to the exclusionary rule if its discovery
would have been inevitable anyway).
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ual privacy in ways never envisioned by the Framers, a narrow
view of the amendment's reach does more violence to the Framers' intentions than does a liberal reading which encompasses
developing challenges to the values protected by the amendment. For example, in his 1977 opinion in United States v.
Chadwick/o 8 Chief Justice Burger stated that: "[T]he Framers
were men who focused on wrongs of that day but who intended
the Fourth Amendment to safeguard fundamental values which
would far outlast the specific abuses which gave it birth.lI1oe In
his celebrated dissent in Olmstead,llo Justice Brandeis in 1928
argued that: "[Constitutional c]lauses guaranteeing to the individual protection against specific abuses of power, must have a
... capacity for adaptation to a changing world[. A] principle to
be vital must be capable of wider application than the mischief
which gave it birth."lll Justice Harlan, concurring in Katz, correctly observed that "limitation of Fourth Amendment protection is, in the present day, bad physics as well as bad law, for
reasonable expectations of privacy may be defeated by electronic
as well as physical invasion."112
There is another reason that Brandeis' view in Olmstead llS
is in particularly germane counterpoint to Oliver's literal approach to the amendment. Not only was Olmstead a central case
in the development of the Hester open fields doctrine that Oliver reaffirmed, but Justice Holmes, the author of Hester, wrote a
dissent in Olmstead which largely adopted Brandeis' dissent.1l4
Contrary to the circumspect approach to the fourth amendment
the Oliver majority adopted in order to resuscitate the open
fields doctrine of Hester, it appears that Holmes felt that a liberal reading of the fourth amendment is the preferable view, and
moreover that the open fields doctrine itself should be applied
with restraint. lUi
108. 433 u.s. 1 (1977).
109. Id. at 9.
110. Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438 (1928).
111. Id. at 472-73 (Brandeis. J., dissenting).
112. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 362 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring).
113. Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 472-73 (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
114. Id at 469 (Holmes, J., dissenting).
115. Holmes was particularly disturbed by the specter of illegal and possibly criminal acts by authorities:
It is desirable that criminals should be detected, and to that
end that all available evidence should be used. It is also desir-
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2. No Societally Reasonable Privacy Expectation Is Possible
In Open Fields

The second base of the revival of the open fields doctrine in
Oliver was the Court's holding that no expectation of privacy
which society would recognize as reasonable and legitimate could
attach to an open field. 116 The majority traced the following
course to reach its conclusion. First, the fourth amendment "reflects the recognition of the Framers that certain enclaves should
be free from arbitrary government interference,"ll7 and this insight underlies the Court's "overriding respect for the sanctity of
the home that has been embedded in our traditions since the
origins of the Republic."118 The "sanctity of the home" in turn
precludes any societally reasonable expectation of privacy in activities occurring in open fields, because they do not partake of
the domestic intimacy119 that characterizes activities taking
place in and immediately about the home. Hence society has no
interest in protecting the "cultivation of crops,"120 and such
other activities that occur in an open field. Activities in the open
field are further compromised, suggested the majority, by their
being difficult to protect from the view of either public or police,
even by fencing and posting against trespassing.121
The Court's sweeping generality that society is not prepared
to recognize reasonable privacy expectations beyond the domestic intimacy of the curtilage, runs afoul of both Katz v. United
States 122 and common sense. Katz held that "the Fourth
able that the Government should not itself foster ... other
crimes, when they are the means by which the evidence is to
be obtained. . . . We have to choose, and for my part I think it
a less evil that some criminals should escape than that the
Government should play an ignoble part.
Id. at 470 (Holmes, J., dissenting).
116. "[A]n individual may not legitimately demand privacy for activities conducted
out of doors in fields[.]" Oliver v. United States, 466 U.S. 170, 178 (1984).
117. Id.
118. Id.
119. "[O]pen fields do not provide the setting for those intimate activities that the
Amendment is intended to shelter from government interference or surveillance." Id. at
179.
120. Id.
121. Id.
122. 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
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Amendment protects people, not places,"123 and further that
what an individual "seeks to preserve as private, even in an area
accessible to the public, may be constitutionally protected."
(Emphasis added.)12.f To arbitrarily declare that a certain
place-the open fields, even when accessible to the public-will
never enjoy societally reasonable privacy expectations, cuts directly against the meaning of Katz.
Common sense suggests that it is not at all clear that society
would deny, as per se unreasonable, certain privacy expectations
in open fields, such as those of the resident of a cabin on secluded mountain acreage whose interest in occupying the property is precisely in the privacy that it affords him. In dissent,1211
Justice Marshall took up this point and chided the majority for
their reluctance or inability to imagine any socially reasonable
privacy expectations that could be entertained in open fields. He
suggested that "[p]rivately owned woods and fields that are not
exposed to public view regularly are employed in a variety of
ways that society acknowledges deserve privacy.1Il26 He mentioned as potential private uses a resident's solitary strolls, lovers' trysts, religious gatherings, and creative activities. 127 Despite
the majority's flat assertion to the contrary, it is difficult to believe that society would not concede the reasonableness of privacy expectations in any of these activities, and many others as
well.

3. The Difficulties in Case-by-Case Determination of Fourth
Amendment Issues
The third reason advanced by the Oliver majority for the
rehabilitation of the open fields doctrine was the majority's desire to avoid the necessity of complex factual determinations of
fourth amendment values, particularly by the police in the field.
Weighing socially reasonable privacy expectations under an ad
hoc approach such as Katz v. United States requires,128 the
Court asserted that "police officers would have to guess before
123.
124.
125.
126.
127.
128.

Id. at 351.
Id. at 351-52.
Oliver v. United States, 466 U.S. 170, 192 (1984) (Marshall, J., dissenting).
Id.
Id.
See supra notes 41-43 and accompanying text.
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every search whether landowners had erected fences sufficiently
high, posted a sufficient number of warning signs, or located
contraband in an area sufficiently secluded to establish a right of
privacy.1Il29 The Court obviously felt that holding that open
fields per se do not enjoy a societally reasonable expectation of
privacy would avoid this type of inquiry. On the contrary, Oliver
requires case-by-case analysis at least as involved as any required by Katz.130
The Court correctly stated in Oliver that a protected privacy expectation must not only be subjectively held by the individual, but also societally reasonable: "[T]he correct inquiry is
whether the government's intrusion infringes upon the personal
and societal values protected by the Fourth Amendment." (Emphasis added.)131 The majority then announced that there is no
societally reasonable privacy expectation in an open field. 132 As
noted above,133 the majority justified this conclusion by pointing
out that the only out-of-doors area that can presume to socially
reasonable privacy expectations is the curtilage, the "area immediately surrounding the home.1Il3" Only within the curtilage occur those "intimate activit[ies]1Il3G that the fourth amendment is
intended to protect. Since by definition the open field is outside
the curtilage, there thus can be no social value in protecting the
presumably non-intimate activities that occur in open fields. 136
The central inquiry for police and courts applying Oliver is
therefore to determine just where the border between the protected curtilage and the unprotected open field lies. And this is
129. Oliver v. United States, 466 U.S. 170, 181 (1984).
130. United States v. Dunn, 107 S.Ct. 1134 (1987) sought to lay down a test that
would resolve extent of curtilage problems raised by applying Oliver in the field. See
infra notes 152-58 and accompanying text. But even Dunn could not eliminate the necessity under Oliver to approach curtilage problems on a case-by-case basis. See State v.
Waldschmidt, 740 P.2d 617, 622 (Kan. Ct. App. 1987): "In Oliver, . ..the Supreme Court
refused to do a case-by-case analysis to ascertain whether, on occasion, an individual's
expectation of privacy in a certain activity in an open field should be protected. [But i]n
Dunn, it is apparent that, from the Court's analysis of whether a barn located within a
fenced area was of the type used for intimate family activities, the Court embarked on a
case-by-case analysis."
131. Oliver, 466 U.S. 170, 182-83.
132. H[T]he ... expectation of privacy in open fields is not an expectation that 'society recognizes as reasonable.' " [d. at 179.
133. See supra notes 116-21 and accompanying text.
134. [d. at 178.
135. [d. at 180.
136. [d. at 179.
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precisely where Oliver's most serious shortcoming arises.
Oliver tells us that courts "have defined the curtilage, as did
the common law, by reference to the factors that determine
whether an individual reasonably may expect that an area immediately adjacent to the home will remain private." (Emphasis
added.)137 This language is virtually indistinguishable from
Katz, under which an individual's privacy will be protected
when his or her privacy expectation is reasonable. 138 The area
around a residence eligible for fourth amendment protection
under Oliver-wherever an individual enjoys reasonable expectations of privacy-is the very same area eligible for protection
under Katz. Oliver has therefore not revived an autonomous
doctrine, but merely restated Katz.
If Oliver is merely Katz paraphrased, it is reasonable to ask
what, then, is objectionable about Oliver. The likely result of Oliver is waste of judicial resources. It is foreseeable that defend-

ants will routinely challenge open field searches and seizures
under both Katz and Oliver; prosecution and defense would be
compelled to argue reasonable expectation of privacy theories
under Katz and open fields theories under Oliver. Since the criteria of either analysis are indistinguishable,139 a court applying
the open fields doctrine will thus litigate the same facts under
two separate theories (i.e., Katz and Oliver), only to reach the
same conclusion in both inquiries. If an avowed object of the
Oliver majority was to make life simpler for courts/ 40 it is difficult to see just what is to be gained by doubling a court's work
to reach an unaltered result. It is easy, however, to see just what
is to be lost: time and, therefore, money.
SUMMARY

Oliver is distressingly unsatisfactory in each of its major aspects. The decision is grounded in a literal reading of the fourth
137. I'd. at 180.
138. "[Protection under the Fourth Amendment is granted when) a person [has)
exhibited an actual (subjective) expectation of priuacy and ... the expectation [is) one
that society is prepared to recognize as 'reasonable.' .. (Emphasis added.) Katz v. United
States, 389 U.S. 347, 361 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring).
139. See supra notes 137-38 and accompanying text.
140. See supra notes 128-30 and accompanying text.
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amendment which runs counter to much of the Court's fourth
amendment jurisprudence. l4l It makes an arbitrary and unconvincing determination that what a resident does on one part of
his property society is prepared to consider reasonably private,
but not that which he does on another part of the same property.U2 The opinion sought to announce a "bright line" rule
designed to avoid ad hoc factual determinations by police and
courts, but instead created a rule which actually requires precisely those determinations. 143
Oliver has not escaped the notice and criticism of commentary. Reservations have been expressed over Oliver's retreat
from expansive fourth amendment jurisprudence, and especially
over the difficulties anticipated in applying Oliver's "bright line"
rule. l44 Ironically, the Sixth Circuit, from which Oliver had gone
up to the Supreme Court, expressed pointed disapproval of the
holding when it had to apply Oliver in a subsequent case. l411

A far better result that Oliver could have reached was the
adoption of the rule suggested by Justice Marshall in dissent: "A
clear, easily administrable rule emerges. [P]rivate land marked
in a fashion sufficient to render entry thereon a criminal trespass under the law of the State in which the land lies is protected by the Fourth Amendment's proscription of unreasonable
searches and seizures." (Emphasis furnished.)146 The major advantage l47 of Marshall's proposed standard is the ease with
which it could be applied: "The police know that body of law
[i.e., trespass law], because they are entrusted with responsibil141. See supra notes 103-15 and accompanying text.
142. See supra notes 116-27 and accompanying text.
143. See supra notes 128-40 and accompanying text.
144. See e.g.: Comment, Affirmation of the Open Fields Doctrine: The Oliver Twist,
46 OHIO ST. L.J. 729 (1985); Note, Criminal Procedure - Oliver and the Open Fields
Doctrine, 7 CAMPBELL L. REV. 253 (1984); Note, Oliver v. United States: Powell Chases
Katz Out of the Fields, 62:3 & 4, DEN U.L. REV. 899 (1985). But see Note, Closing the
"Open Fields" Question: Oliver v. United States, 1985 B.Y.U. L. REV. 191; Note, Curtilage or Open Fields? Oliver v. United States Gives Renewed Significance to the Concept
of Curtilage in Fourth Amendment Analysis, 46 U. PITT. L. REV. 795 (1985).
145. United States v. Hoskins, 735 F.2d 1006 (6th Cir. 1984). The majority in Hoskins was overt enough in their, disapproval of Oliver that Nichols, J., concurring, felt it
prudent to distance himself from the language of the majority opinion.
146. Oliver v. United States, 466 U.S. 170, 195 (1984) (Marshall, J., dissenting).
147. Another recommendation for Marshall's proposal is that it eliminates the appearance of courts permitting illegal trespass by the police on private property. For a
discussion of this point, see infra notes 187-93 and accompanying text.
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ity for enforcing it against the public; it therefore would not be
difficult for the police to abide by it themselves. "148
A further advantage to using criminal trespass as a threshold test for open field searches is that it would not appreciably
hinder law enforcement. The trespass test need not be a per se
rule that outright forbids a warrantless police intrusion onto private property, but merely a presumption that the property enjoys a constitutionally protected privacy interest under the
fourth amendment. This presumption could be rebutted whenever a warrantless search or seizure came within any of the recognized exceptions to the warrant requirement such as plain
view,149 consent,tIlO hot pursuit,tlll or others.

UNITED STATES V. DUNN
Mindful of the difficulties to be anticipated in applying Oliver,11l2 the Court in United States v. Dunn lll3 set out to resolve
them by establishing a test for delimiting the curtilage of a residence that will receive protection under the fourth amendment
after Oliver.11l4

Dunn reiterated the revival of the open fields doctrine in
Oliver,1IIII and again declined to accept Justice Marshall's suggestion that criminal trespass be the basic test of fourth amendment privacy expectations in the curtilage. lII6 Instead,
"[d]rawing upon the Court's own cases and the cumulative experience of the lower courts that have grappled with the task of
defining the extent of a home's curtilage,"11l7 the Dunn majority
stated that curtilage questions should be resolved with particular reference to four factors: (1) the proximity of the claimed
148. [d. at 196.
149. Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 392 U.S. 1 (1968).
150. Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218 (1973).
151. Dorman v. United States, 435 F.2d 385 (D.C.Cir. 1970).
152. See infra note 154 and accompanying text.
153. 107 S.Ct. 1134 (1987).
154. "We granted the Government's petition for certiorari to decide whether the
area near a barn .. .is, for Fourth Amendment purposes, within the curtilage." [d. at
1137.
155. "We reaffirmed the holding of Hester in Oliver v. United States." [d. at 1139.
156. [d. at 1145 n.3 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
157. [d. at 1139.
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curtilage area to the home, (2) whether the claimed curtilage is
within an enclosure surrounding the home, (3) the use(s) to
which the claimed curtilage was put and, (4) steps taken by the
resident to protect the claimed curtilage from observation by
passers by .1118
Even though the majority itself admitted that its test does
not constitute a "finely tuned formula"11l9 that will solve every
curtilage problem, it would be reasonable to expect that the factors would at least reflect the Court's priorities in evaluating
open fields-curtilage controversies. Unfortunately, examination
of the factors reveals that their contours are slippery and imprecise. At least when considered in the abstract, the Dunn factors
appear to be poor predictors of the outcome of curtilage cases.
Each of the factors will be examined separately below. A summary will then suggest an approach preferable to the difficulties
posed by Dunn.
"The proximity of the area claimed to be curtilage to the
home"
1.

This first Dunn factor 180 has an initial appeal; it stands
seemingly to reason that the farther away from the resident's
house a specific site may be, the less likely are the resident's
privacy expectations in that site to be reasonable. But there is a
logical defect to this reasoning. Proximity is at the heart of any
curtilage problem; there is some distance beyond the house past
which fourth amendment protection simply will not reach. The
problem faced by authorities conducting a warrantless search
(and courts reviewing the authorities' actions) is to remain in
the unprotected open fields and outside the protected curtilage.
Their primary concern will be how close, how proximate, to a
house they may come, without violating the resident's reasonable expectation of privacy. When the policeman's problem is
thus one of proximity, it is tautological to suggest that somehow
proximity is simultaneously the solution to his problem.
158. [d.

159. "We do not suggest that combining these factors produces a finely tuned
formula that, when mechanically applied, yields a 'correct' answer to all extent-of-curtilage questions." [d.
160. [d.
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2. "Whether the area is included within an enclosure surrounding the home"
This second Dunn factor16l may be a reliable indicator of
the curtilage in many cases. The usefulness of this factor would
probably be limited to urban and suburban contexts, however,
with their relatively small parcels of residential land. There,
fences and enclosures in most instances probably correspond to
their owners' privacy expectations, because the enclosure also
corresponds to property lines. But this factor may be of marginal utility in rural areas. There, fences may have less to do with
privacy expectations than with protecting children, lawns, gardens and pets from farm vehicles and livestock. 162
The majority suggested as much when it declined the government's invitation to create a "first fence" rule, to the effect
that the fence nearest to a house marks the extent of the house's
curtilage. 163 The Court declined the invitation because
"[a]pplication of the Government's [rule] might well lead to diminished Fourth Amendment protection in those cases where a
structure lying outside a home's enclosing fence was [nevertheless] used for domestic purposes."164 The Court also pointed out
that "in those cases where a house is situated on a large parcel
of property and has no nearby enclosing fence, the Government's rule would serve no utility; a court would still be required
to assess the [other] factors [of the Dunn test] to define the extent of the curtilage. "1611 With qualifications, this second factor
of Dunn could prove useful in fixing the border between the curtilage and the open field in some cases.

3.

"The nature of the uses to which the area is put"

This third factor of the Dunn test 166 harks back directly to
Oliver 167 in its inquiry into the type of activity that distinguishes
161.
162.
163.
164.
165.
166.

[d.

See infra note 164 and accompanying text.
Dunn, 107 S.Ct. 1134, 1139 n.4.
[d.
[d.
[d.

167. Oliver v. United States, 466 U.S. 170 (1984).
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the curtilage 168 from the open field. 160 The majority found it "especially significant that the law enforcement officials possessed
objective data indicating that [Dunn's] barn was not being used
for intimate activities of the home." (Emphasis furnished.)170
Theoretically, if a police officer can be reasonably certain that
an area of residential property is not used for intimate domestic
purposes, he or she can thus be reasonably certain that the area
is in the open field and not the curtilage. But the determination
of the operative principle of this factor-domestic intimacy-requires the complex ad hoc judgments that Oliver deplored,171 because Dunn is silent on just how an officer is to decide what is and is not an intimate domestic activity for
purposes of fourth amendment analysis.
4. "The steps taken by the resident to protect the area from
observation by people passing by"

This fourth factor of the Dunn test172 is simply an aspect of
the subjective privacy expectation prong of Katz privacy expectation analysis.17s The precautions taken by a resident to protect
his property from public view in many cases would likely be an
accurate indication of the resident's subjective privacy expectations. But, like the third Dunn factor,174 this factor also invites
complex on-the-spot evaluations in the field; officers would have
to determine if a resident's precautions evidenced a subjective
privacy expectation that satisfies Katz. If the precautions established a sufficient subjective privacy interest, the officer must
then confront the other prong of the Katz test,17II and make the
difficult determination of whether the resident's privacy expectation is one that society would recognize as reasonable. 176 Thus,
168. "[I]ntimate activity." [d. at 178.
169. "[N]ot... the setting for those intimate activities." [d. at 179.
170. United States v. Dunn, 107 S.Ct. 1134, 1140 (1987).
171. Oliver v. United States, 466 U.S. 170, 181 (1984).
172. Dunn, 107 S.Ct. 1134, 1139 (1987).
173. "My understanding of the rule that has emerged .. .is that there is a twofold
requirement, first that a person have exhibited an actual (subjective) expectation of
privacy . ... " Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 361 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring)
(emphasis added).
174. See supra notes 166-71 and accompanying text.
175. "[S)econd, that the expectation be one that society is prepared to recognize as
'reasonable.' " Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 361 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring).
176. See supra note 43 and accompanying text.
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rather than avoiding the ad hoc police judgments required by
Katz, this factor of Dunn directly requires them.
SUMMARY
On balance, the four factors of the Dunn test are unlikely to
contribute materially to the solution of open fields-curtilage
problems. The first factor merely restates the crux of every curtilage issue. 177 The second factor would probably be useful in urban and suburban contexts, but may be of only dubious utility
where rural curtilages are in controversy.178 The third factor and
fourth factors are relevant, but invite precisely the same caseby-case factual determinations that Oliver sought to avoid. 179
CONCLUSION
There are hints in Oliver and Dunn which may suggest why
the Court wished to revive the open fields doctrine of Hester. In
its language distinguishing the open fields from the curtilage,
the majority repeatedly emphasized how limited it considered
the reach of the curtilage;I80 the renewed open fields doctrine
may perhaps represent the Court's desire to limit the extent of
residential privacy expectations that it is prepared to find reasonable in fourth amendment controversies generally. This
would be consistent with a recent tendency of the Court to take
a narrower view of fourth amendment protection. I81 On the
other hand, a common thread running through all three cases
subsumed within Oliver and Dunn is the involvement of drug
offenses;I82 the Court may instead or also be signalling that it is
prepared to give very little fourth amendment slack to the suspect in a drug case. I8S
177. See supra note 160 and accompanying text.
178. See supra notes 161-65 and accompanying text.
179. See supra notes 166-76 and accompanying text.
180. "[T)he land immediately surrounding and associated with the home . . . . an
area immediately adjacent to the home." (Emphasis added.) Oliver v. United States, 466
U.S. 170, 180 (1984).
181. See supra note 107 and accompanying text.
182. See supra notes 55, 70, and 76 and accompanying text.
183. In an approximately nine month period following the time Dunn was handed
down on March 3, 1987, lower courts that have relied on or cited to Dunn have largely
adopted this approach: the majority of their decisions have dealt with prosecutions for
drug-related offenses. See e. g.: U. S. v. Calabrese, 825 F.2d 1342 (9th Cir. 1987) (conspir-
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Whatever the ultimate purpose behind them, Oliver and
Dunn say too much and accomplish too little. Oliver posited a
"bright line" test - the open fields doctrine - which was intended to avoid ad hoc factual judgments of fourth amendment
issues by police and courts,184 but nevertheless requires precisely
the ad hoc determinations it sought to avoid. 1811 Dunn compounds the problem by proposing a test for determining the extent of the curtilage which appears to be of little potential use in
ameliorating the practical difficulties of applying Oliver. 186
A particularly troubling aspect of both Oliver and Dunn is
their majorities' apparent indifference to the constitutional implications of potential criminal trespass by the police operating
under the open fields doctrine. 167 In his dissent in Oliver, Justice
acy to manufacture and distribute methamphetamine); Feliciano v. City of Cleveland,
661 F.Supp. 578 (N.D. Ohio 1987) (drug testing of police academy cadets); People v. Morgan, 196 Cal. App. 3d 816, 242 Cal.Rptr. 142 (1987) (possession of cocaine for sale); People v. Morgan, 195 Cal. App. 3d 479, 240 Cal. Rptr. 658 (1987) (cultivation and possession of marijuana for sale); Riley v. State, 511 So.2d 282 (Fla. 1987) (cultivation of
marijuana); State v. Waldschmidt, 12 Kan. App. 2d 284, 740 P.2d 617 (1987) (possession
of marijuana with intent to sell and possession of drug paraphernalia); State v. Stokes,
511 So.2d 1317 (La. Ct. App. 1987) (cultivation of marijuana); State v. Krech, 403
N.W.2d 634 (Minn. 1987) (possession and possession with intent to sell cocaine); State v.
Tarantino, 358 S.E.2d 131 (N.C. Ct. App. 1987) (manufacturing marijuana); Grider v.
State, 743 P.2d 678 (Okla. Crim. App. 1987) (cultivation and possession of marijuana
with intent to distribute); Commonwealth v. Lemanski 529 A.2d 1085 (Pa. Super. Ct.
1987) (manufacture of marijuana and possession of a controlled substance); Leal v. State,
736 S.W.2d 907 (Tex. Ct. App. 1987) (possession of marijuana); Kearney v. Commonwealth, 855 S.E.2d 897 (Va. Ct. App. 1987) (possession of drugs with intent to distribute
and possession of drug paraphernalia); State v. Bell, 108 Wash.2d 193, 737 P.2d 254
(1987) (cultivation of marijuana); State v. Petty, 48 Wash. App. 615, 740 P.2d 879 (1987).
But see e. g.: State v. Ball, 219 N.J. Super. 501, 530 A.2d 833 (1987) (receiving stolen
property); State v. Washington, 357 S.E.2d 419 (N.C. Ct. App. 1987) (breaking and entering, felony larceny, and possession of stolen goods).
184. See supra notes 128-30 and accompanying text.
185. See supra notes 131-40 and accompanying text.
186. See supra notes 160-76 and accompanying text.
187. This was particularly egregious in Dunn. There, it is apparent that probable
cause sufficient to justify the issuance of a search warrant existed before the officers'
warrantless intrusions on Dunn's property: "The government makes a compelling argument that it had probable cause." United States v. Dunn, 674 F.2d 1093, 1100 (6th Cir.
1982). The court noted the accumulation of equipment and chemicals-known through
aerial and electronic surveillance to be at Dunn's ranch-purchased by Dunn's co-defendant with cash and some under alias, Dunn's prior criminal record involving controlled substances, and the remoteness of Dunn's property. Id. Except for deficient police
work, therefore, the multiple police trespasses onto Dunn's property would not have
been necessary. "Accepting that probable cause to search the ranch property existed on
November 5 and 6, a search warrant was mandatory unless exigent circumstances excused that constitutional requirement." Id. But "[a)lthough obtained on the night of
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Marshall expressed his concern on this point. 188 He stated that
"a deliberate entry by a private citizen onto private property
marked with 'No Trespassing signs will expose him to criminal
liability. I see no reason why a government official should not be
obliged to respect such unequivocal and universally understood
manifestations of a landowner's desire for privacy."189
The majority attempted to discount the gravity of this potential problem by asserting that because trespass is a property
crime, fourth amendment privacy concerns are therefore not implicated in official trespass on private property. It argued that
"trespass law extends to instances where the exercise of the
right to exclude vindicates no legitimate privacy interest, [and]
the government's intrusion upon an open field [is therefore not]
a 'search' in the constitutional sense because that intrusion is a
trespass."l90 According to the majority, a violation of trespass
laws by police conducting a warrantless search or seizure thus
would not comprehend privacy expectations protected by the
fourth amendment. Elsewhere in Oliver, however, the majority
vitiated this argument when it allowed that "[t]he existence of a
property right is but one element in determining whether expectations of privacy are legitimate." (Emphasis added.)191 By its
own concession, the majority admits that abuse of property
rights by nonconsensual police intrusion can contribute to the
elevation of a common law trespass to the level of a fourth
amendment violation.
Aside from the constitutional implications, there is another
reason to be concerned with the potential for police trespass
under the open fields doctrine of Oliver and Dunn. One purpose
of the fourth amendment is to limit the police powers of the
state. 192 It is difficult to think of a more appropriate limit on the
powers of police than ensuring that the police themselves do not
themselves violate a law which they are obliged to enforce
November 6, 1980, the warrant was not executed until approximately 10:00 a. m. on
November 8, despite the entry of agents on November 7. The necessity for swift action,
which purportedly justified the warrantless entries on November 5 and 6, is not apparent
in the officers' post-warrant conduct." Id. at 1102.
188. Oliver v. United States, 466 U. S. 170, 184 (1984) (Marshall, J., dissenting).
189. Id. at 194-95.
190. Id. at 183.
191. Id.
192. See supra note 19.
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against others-in this case criminal trespass. Justice Brandeis'
Olmstead dissent is worth considering in this regard: "Our Government is the potent, the omnipresent teacher. For good or ill,
it teaches the whole people by its example. Crime is contagious.
If the Government becomes a lawbreaker, it breeds contempt for
law."193
Oliver and Dunn are wild cards existing alongside Katz. Police and courts will have to waste valuable time making the same
analysis under "open fields" theory that is required under the
Katz inquiry into reasonable expectations of privacy/9. and additionally comply with any case law construing the new open
fields "doctrine." Because defendants henceforth will probably
routinely attack extra-residential searches and seizures under
both Katz and open fields analysis,1911 the open fields doctrine of
Oliver and Dunn gratuitously compounds whatever difficulties
already are involved in fourth amendment jurisprudence under
Katz. 196

With Dunn's explicit approval of Oliver, it is unlikely the
Court will retreat from its revival of the open fields doctrine any
time soon. It is possible, however, to avoid many of the analytical and practical difficulties that appear to be inevitable in dealing with the doctrine. The Court's best alternative, of course,
would have been to adopt Justice Marshall's suggestion that
criminal trespass is likely to be the most reliable index of protectable privacy interests in any potential curtilage. 197 State
courts may still adopt this position outright if their state constitutions are more solicitous of privacy interests than is the fourth
amendment of the federal constitution. 19s Even federal courts
193. Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 485 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
194. See supra notes 137-38 and accompanying text.
195. [d. at 139-40.
196. See e.g.: State v. Tarantino, 358 S.E.2d 131 (N.C. Ct. App. 1987) (on remand
for reconsideration in light of Dunn. Held: despite reconsideration instructions of state
supreme court, Katz reasonable expectation of privacy analysis controls, not Dunn extent-of-curtilage analysis. "The decision of the United State Supreme Court in Dunn did
nothing to alter the rule that the Fourth Amendment applies whenever the person invoking its protection has exhibited an actual expectation of privacy which society is prepared to recognize as reasonable." [d. at 133.).
197. See supra notes 146-51 and accompanying text.
198. See e.g.: Grider v. State, 743 P.2d 678, 682 (Okla. Crim. App. 1987), which
noted: "[T]he United States Supreme Court's 'explicit acknowledgement of the right of
state courts, as the final interpreters of state law to impose higher standards on searches
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can avoid the problems of Oliver and Dunn by heeding Dunn's
disclaimer that: "We do not suggest that combining these factors
[of the Dunn test] ... yields a 'correct' answer to all extent-ofcurtilage questions. Rather, these factors are useful analytical
tools only to the degree that, in any given case, they bear upon
the centrally relevant consideration-whether the area in question is so intimately tied to the home itself that it should be
placed under the home's 'umbrella' of Fourth Amendment protection." (Emphasis added.)199 Since the Court has therefore not
required that the Dunn factors be controlling, federal and state
courts are both free-and well-advised-to consider trespass law
as a "fifth Dunn factor" which can in most cases reliably indicate the presence and extent of protectable fourth amendment
privacy interests. If any standard is to provide the "bright line"
test that Oliver and Dunn sought to create, criminal trespass by
police is the most tenable candidate.

Thomas E. Curran III*

and seizures than those required by the federal constitution.''' (Parks. J., concurring,
citing Turner v. City of Lawton, 733 P.2d 375, 381 (Okla. 1986)).
199. United States v. Dunn, 107 S.Ct. 1134, 1139 (1987).
* Golden Gate University School of Law, Class of 1989.
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